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This article investigates impacts of hospital autonomization in Viet Nam employing a “decision-space”
framework that examines how hospitals have used their increased discretion and to what effect. Analysis
suggests autonomization is associated with increased revenue, increasing staff pay, and greater invest-
ment in infrastructure and equipment. But autonomization is also associated with more costly and
intensive treatment methods of uncertain contribution to the Vietnamese government’s stated goal of
quality healthcare for all. Impacts of autonomization in district hospitals are less striking. Despite certain
limitations, the analysis generates key insights into early stages of hospital autonomization in Viet Nam.
 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.Introduction
In recent years governments around the world have adopted
hospital autonomization measures as part of broader health system
reforms. Prospective beneﬁts of autonomization include enhanced
efﬁciency, improved responsiveness to local needs, and better
health outcomes. Prospective risks include reduced efﬁciency, the
marginalization of public interests, and deleterious health out-
comes. There is, however, no consensus as to autonomization’s
merits or demerits, despite an increasing volume of research on the
subject. Nor is consensus likely. Hospital autonomization is com-
plex and its effects are difﬁcult to measure, while evidence mar-
shaled for or against it is typically too mixed to permit
generalization. Furthermore, autonomization is deeply politicized
and its analysis is clouded by normative assumptions about states
and markets in the creation and allocation of health services. As
such, inquiry is perhaps best directed to probing autonomization’s
impacts in speciﬁc settings.
This article probes the impacts of autonomization in Viet Nam
on hospitals’ discretionary powers and with respect to various
functional and performance outcomes. The analysis draws on the
ﬁrst substantial empirical investigation of hospital autonomizationLtd. Open access under CC BY-NC-SAin Viet Nam, in which the present author was a co-investigator. It
ﬁnds that autonomization is transforming hospitals’ management
and ﬁnancial functions, though in highly varied ways and with
uncertain implications for the quality and accessibility of care. The
analysis questions the merits of autonomization as it is being
practiced in Viet Nam, where health sector governance remains
weak.
Hospital autonomization
Hospital autonomization increases public hospitals’ managerial
autonomy while retaining public ownership and government
structures of accountability. As such, it entails a shift from
centralized management to the formation of quasi-independent
service-delivery organizations. A major impetus for undertaking
autonomization has been the desire to overcome perceived in-
efﬁciencies of centrally-managed, budget-ﬁnanced hospital sys-
tems in a way that stops short of privatization and protects the
social missions of public health (Preker & Harding, 2003). Often,
hospital autonomization has occurred within the context of
broader decentralizing reforms, introduced for reasons varying
from efﬁciency to politically expediency (Lieberman, Capuno, & Van
Minh, 2005). In developing countries, the World Bank has pro-
moted decentralization and autonomization through advocacy,
ﬁnance, technical assistance.
The volume of policy and scholarly analysis of hospital auton-
omization has increased in recent years, evidenced by the appear-
ance of three edited volumes (Govindaraj & Chawla, 1996; Preker &
Harding, 2003; Saltman, Durán, & Dubois, 2011) and numerous license.
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in Asia, China (e.g. Hipgrave, Sufang, & Brixi, 2012; Yip, Hsiao, Meng,
Chen, & Sun, 2010), India (Sharma & Hotchkiss, 2001), Thailand
(Hawkins, Srisasalux, & Osornprasop, 2011) and, Viet Nam
(Wagstaff & Bales, 2012). As these studies show, the nature, scope,
and outcomes of hospital autonomization have varied considerably
across countries. While credited with improvements in service
quality and efﬁciency gains in such areas as inventorymanagement,
autonomization has also been linked to deteriorations in the quality
of care and increases in the cost of care (Bossert & Beauvais, 2001;
Bossert, Kosen, Harsono, & Gani, 1996; Gao, Tang, Tolhurst, & Rao,
2001, Segall, 2003). By contrast, Wagstaff and Bales contend that
“there “is no hard evidence” that autonomization promotes efﬁ-
ciency; nor is there any “hard evidence” that autonomization
damages equity and ﬁnancial protection (Wagstaff & Bales, 2012, p.
3).” The difﬁculties in evaluating impacts of autonomization are
indeed manifold. Clear evaluation strategies are typically absent,
foreclosing cross-case comparison, while baseline data are
frequently lacking, increasing reliance on simple before and after
comparisons (Over & Watanabe, 2003). Finally, research on
autonomization is politicized. Notes one analyst, there is “far more
argumentation in favor of the merits of privatization and corpora-
tization than scientiﬁc evaluation of their beneﬁts (Braithwaite,
Travaglia, & Corbett, 2011, p. 150).” Perhaps the only generalizable
conclusion to be drawn is that outcomes of autonomization are
profoundly contingent. With this in mind we now turn to the case
of Viet Nam.
Hospital autonomization in Viet Nam
With its history of central planning and recent record of rapid
market-based economic growth, Viet Nam represents a particularly
interesting setting for the analysis of hospital autonomization. Viet
Nam’s market-transition occasioned profound changes in the
principles and institutions governing the country’s health system
and its public hospitals in particular. Although Viet Nam’s market-
transition generated acute pressures on the health sector, basic
health services were not subject to the kind of malign neglect
observed in China (London, 2013; Wang, 2010). While sustained
economic growth, increases in health spending, and international
aid have contributed to signiﬁcant if uneven improvements in Viet
Nam’s health status. In comparison to other countries of compa-
rable income, Viet Nam scores well on such indicators as life ex-
pectancy, infant and child mortality, and morbidity.
Yet Viet Nam’s health system exhibits numerous deﬁciencies.
These include unevenness in the quality of care, overcrowding,
reliance on out-of-pocket payments, breakdowns in the referral
chain, and medical corruption (MOH, 2009; Ramesh, 2012). While
total health spending has increased markedly, public health
expenditure remains low as a proportion of GDP, reﬂecting a broad
shifting of institutional responsibilities for health payments from
the state onto households, and contributing to income-based
health inequalities. The expansion of state health insurance has
introduced a degree of protection. Yet coverage remains limited and
access to quality care is highly contingent on household payments
(London, 2013).
Viet Nam’s public hospitals
As of 2007, 95 percent of Viet Nam’s 1119 hospitals were public
and all but 48 fell under state ownership (MOH, 2007). Viet Nam’s
hospitals are diverse, differing “vertically” in scale and function and
“horizontally” in the socioeconomic context of their operations and
in the qualities of their infrastructure, management, staff, and
services. With an average number of beds below 80, Viet Nam’s 597district-level hospitals represent the ﬁrst level of hospital care and
are where the majority of Viet Nam’s large rural population seeks
treatment. Variation in district hospitals’ sophistication and service
quality broadly reﬂects regional socioeconomic disparities. At the
secondary level are 324 provincial and municipal hospitals, located
mostly in provincial towns and major cities. Ranging from 300 to
500 beds, these hospitals provide services to local and regional
populations. Since the 1990s provincial and municipal hospitals
have seen fast growth in service utilization and are commonly
overcrowded. At the tertiary level are 31 centrally-managed hos-
pitals, mostly located in large cities. Averaging over 500 beds, these
are Viet Nam’s most technically-sophisticated hospitals. Not sur-
prisingly, central hospitals are preferred over provincial ones, while
district hospitals are least preferred, undermining the referral
chain.
Until 1989 hospitals in Viet Nam were ﬁnanced largely through
the state budget. Yet by 1989 Viet Nam had entered a ﬁscal crisis
and for much of the 1990s, public spending on health remained at
very low levels, while incomes grew. Decrees issued in 1989 and
1995 permitted hospitals to charge fees and retain a share of rev-
enues for general purposes and staff bonuses. The signiﬁcance of
such income varied. In wealthier provinces and in cities, hospitals
were able to tap into rising incomes and increased demand for
services. Rural areas saw much slower incomes growth, however.
Facing limited budgets, hospitals depended on a patchwork of
informal autonomous measures, ranging from provision of private
services on hospitals premises to quasi-legal and illicit business
schemes to the receipt and solicitation of informal payments.
Quasi-legal business ventures took diverse forms. As early as 1996,
for example, Da Nang hospital (which is included in this study)
formed a joint venture with Saigon Textiles Company, whereby the
latter installed medical equipment to be offered on a fees-paying
basis. A different sort of venture could be observed at rural dis-
trict hospitals, where it was not uncommon to observemedical staff
selling noodles outside the hospital gates. Hospital autonomy in
Viet Nam is thus, not strictly new. And over time, hospitals became
increasingly reliant on non-budgetary sources of revenue to
maintain their operations. Generally, the improvisational strategies
hospitals undertook outpaced policy reforms issued by the center.
Until 2012, for example, most hospital fees were ﬁxed to a schedule
set in 1994. More often, policies appeared as post-hoc efforts to
contain already existing practices.
Autonomization by decree
Autonomization measures in 2002 and 2006, however, repre-
sented a signiﬁcant policy shift. Issued in 2002, Government Decree
10 stipulated all income-generating (public) service-delivery units
(SDUs) be classiﬁed as fully or partially ﬁnancially-autonomous
entities, according to their relative dependence on budgetary
transfers. To reduce strains on the central budget, Decree 10
encouraged SDUs to develop alternative income sources and
channel resultant revenues into investment and human resource
funds. Depending on their designation, SDUs were permitted de-
grees of discretion over the management and organization of ser-
vices and the allocation of income. SDUs would bear independent
responsibility for accounting, reporting, audits, and ﬁnancial
transparency requirements. Non-budgetary sources of revenue
could include self-generated income, external grants, loans, and
gifts.
While Decree 10 promoted autonomization, it tightened regu-
lations governing hospitals’ use of revenues by restricting claim-
ancy rights to net revenues (viz. minus recurrent expenditures). It
further stipulated that some of these revenues be invested for
upgrading facilities and that only a portion of net revenues (albeit
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rest would be used to stabilize hospital income, make contingency
payments, and fund staff development schemes. Notably, Decree 10
put relatively stringent caps on the allowance and bonuses
(Wagstaff & Bales, 2012, p. 10). Decree implementationwas halting.
Explicit guidance for implementation was not disseminated until
2004. This, combined with the decree’s restrictive provisions,
explained why hospitals greeted its introduction with considerable
apprehension. At the time of its implementation, many hospitals
were already engaged in practices that exceeded the decree’s
provisions.
In 2006 Decree 10 was replaced by the more sweeping Decree
43, which divided SDUs into three categories: fully-ﬁnancially
autonomous, partially-ﬁnancially autonomous, and fully-
subsidized units, ﬁxed for and revaluated on a triennial basis. De-
cree 43 stipulated that 25 percent of revenues be used for facility
upgrades and that the remaining 75 percent could be used for
supplementing staff income, though capped these payments as
under Decree 10 for Category B hospitals. Operationally, Decree 43
conferred greater managerial and ﬁnancial autonomy. This, it was
envisaged, would further reduce strain on state budget, encourage
improvements in the range and quality of services, and beneﬁt staff
pay. Under both decrees, oversight was to be undertaken by pro-
vincial Departments of Health.
Studies of autonomization in Viet Nam
Hospital autonomization is a politically charged issue and the
hunger for stories and scandal among Viet Nam’s press has led the
Ministry of Health to adopt an extraordinarily restrictive approach
to the management of information. Since 2007, MOH’s Institute of
Health Policy and Strategy has undertaken an additional study of a
similar scale (IHSP, 2012). But the raw data has not been made
available beyond a small circle of policymakers.Wagstaff and Bales’
(2012) recent study is of particular interest. Employing a large N
design featuring hospital and household data, they ﬁnd that
autonomization affected bed stocks and bed-occupancy rates, but
did not apparently increase hospital efﬁciency. While they ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant increase in total costs, they do ﬁnd sometimes large
increases in out-of-pocket spending on hospital care, and higher
spending per treatment episode. While they ﬁnd no evidence au-
tonomy affected in-hospital death rates or complications, they do
ﬁnd provincial and district hospitals have adopted an increasingly
intensive style of care, characterized by more lab tests and imaging
per case.
Investigating effects of autonomization
In 2007 the author and researchers at Viet Nam’s Institute of
Health Strategy and Policy designed and undertook the ﬁrst sub-
stantial study of hospital autonomization in Viet Nam. This study
employed a cross-section design with an imitated control-
intervention; the intervention being decree implementation. Us-
ing mixed methods, the study aimed to produce a ﬁne-grained
analysis of autonomization in a 14 hospitals distributed across the
municipal, provincial, and district levels in three cities, four prov-
inces, and six districts across northern, central, and southern Viet
Nam.
Likely effects of autonomization
Of central concern were those changes set in motion by the
implementation of Decrees 10 and 43, which conferred greater
decision rights to hospital directors over service organization and
management and increased claimancy rights of staff and investorsover hospital’s net revenues. This article investigates a subset of
hypothesized outcomes concerning decision space, service orga-
nization, revenues, and hospital performance.
Autonomy and decision space
The decrees’ provisions applied to all but one of the hospitals
sampled. Variationwas anticipated in the degree to which hospitals
would demonstrate autonomy. Municipal and provincial hospitals,
because they are located in wealthier areas, and have superior
infrastructure and possess larger, more functionally differentiated,
and better trained staff, are better positioned than district hospitals
to exploit the opportunities autonomization presents. It was thus
expected that real (i.e. demonstrated autonomy) would be highest
in municipal and provincial hospitals and in district hospitals
located in wealthier areas, and lowest in district-level hospitals,
particularly those in relatively poor districts.
Service organization and management
Within limits, autonomization permits hospitals to indepen-
dently allocate resources in ways that are more efﬁcient with
respect to some desired goal, such as increasing revenues or
improving the quality of care. Autonomizationwas thus expected to
occasion signiﬁcant changes in service organization in some hos-
pitals. Prior to ﬁeldwork, media reports had documented the rising
availability of “patient-requested services” in public hospitals
(which refers to the introduction of special hospital beds and entire
wings catering to higher-fees paying patients) and increasing
numbers of joint ventures between hospitals and outside investors.
Owing to incentives to maximize revenues, autonomy was also
expected to induce hospitals to reduce overhead costs. It was
therefore hypothesized that higher autonomy would be positively
associated with the introduction of new and proﬁtable services and
equipment, increases in hospital beds, and the adoption of costs
saving measures. With respect to management, it was expected
more autonomous hospitals would more vigorously hire new staff
and invest in skilling.
Revenues
Autonomous hospitals have an incentive to increase net reve-
nues as doing so raises the amount of resources available for allo-
cation to staff pay, investment in hospital infrastructure and
training, and payments to shareholders (Harding & Preker, 2000, p.
11; Liu, Martineau, Chen, Zhan, & Tang, 2006). One might expect
opportunities for and increased revenues from autonomization to
be higher in urban areas, where incomes are relatively higher. In
addition to the introduction of patient-requested services and cost-
saving measures, hospitals might maximize revenues through
other means, such as patient skimming, increasing admissions, and
prolonging average length of stay (ALOS). Bearing in mind other
factors that might result in increased revenues (e.g. increasing
household income and payments from insurance), the study hy-
pothesized that autonomy would be positively and signiﬁcantly
associated with increased revenues and average revenue per pa-
tient bed.
Performance/quality
Critics have downplayed autonomization’s prospective contri-
butions to efﬁciency while emphasizing its harmful effects on the
quality, costs, and equity (Homedes & Ugalde, 2005). One might
thus expect higher autonomy to occasion increase incidence of
patient skimming, superﬂuous diagnostic procedures, higher ALOS,
and various income maximizing practices. In this way, autonom-
ization might exacerbate moral hazards associated with the roll out
of health insurance (Sepehri, Simpson, & Sarma, 2006). A more
optimistic hypothesis, selected here, is that more autonomous
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rights to achieve improvements in the quality of services (Harding
& Preker, 2000). It is conceivable that improved service quality,
however achieved, would facilitate increased revenues by attract-
ing patients, further government support, and investment. It is also
conceivable that, in combination with increased payments from
insurance, district hospitals could reduce referrals and undertake
investments in infrastructure and skilling in ways previously
impossible.
Methods
The sample aimed to capture diversity by selecting different
kinds of hospitals (municipal/provincial/district) in different so-
cioeconomic contexts (relatively wealthy and poor) across different
regions (north, central, and south). A “small n” design was chosen
to permit ﬁne-grained analysis. Hospital data was collected for the
years 2001e2006 using 13 structured questionnaires targeting
different functional areas of hospitals’ operations (e.g. ﬁnance,
service organization, stafﬁng) and relevant performance indicators.
This was accompanied by ﬁeld visits and systematic in-depth semi-
structured interviews of local authorities, hospital directors, and
staff conducted by the research team, present author included
(Image 1). Ethics approval was sought and granted from the Min-
istry of Health. The design of questionnaires and interviews drew
on methods employed by Thomas Bossert (e.g., Bossert & Mitchell,
2011, Web-accessible appendix). In Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City
(HCMC) two obstetrics and gynecology hospitals were selected:
Hanoi OBGN and Tu Du, respectively. For each of four provinces, the
main provincial hospital was selected along with two district hos-
pitals, including one in a low income district and one in a higher
income district. The imitated control-design component (selecting
hospitals on timing of implementation) was meant to capture dif-
ferences before and after implementation. By 2007 all but one
hospital in the sample had begun implementation.
Autonomy and implementation
The study sought to gauge the extent to which hospitals exer-
cised decision rights formal autonomization conferred. Question-
naires and interviews used a “decision-space” framework to track
responses to autonomization across different functional ﬁelds of
hospitals operations (Bossert, 1998). Seven indicators of decision
space were assessed, including the extent to which hospitals self-
determined expenditures, the signiﬁcance of capital mobilized
from external sources, expansion or diversiﬁcation of services,
participation in joint ventures, reallocation or dismissal of staff, and
the use of contract (versus permanent) staff. A four-point rubric
was applied to score hospitals across these indicators, permitting
the construction of an indexed composite measure. A simpler in-
dicator of autonomye reliance on budget transfersewas also used.Table 1
Assessing autonomy, 13 hospitals.
Dimension of autonomy Hospital
Tu Du Hanoi Tien
Giang
Da Nang Quang
Nam
Implementation of Decree 10, 43 2005 2004 2004 2003 2004
Formal autonomy Full Partial Partial Partial Partial
Self-determined expend. norms þþþ þþ þþ þþ þþ
Mobilization of capital/income þþþ þþþ þþ þþþ þþ
Expansion of services þþþ þþþ þþþ þþ þ
Joint ventures þ þþ þ þþ þ
Staff pay þþþ þþþ þþ þþþ þ
Staff reallocation     
Contract-based employment þþ þ þ þþ þ
þ and  Indicate degree of autonomy based on analysis of interview and survey data.The research also sought to probe variation in decree imple-
mentation, including the timing and modalities of autonomization
and the participation and attitudes of local authorities and hospital
staff.
Service organization/revenues/performance
Data was collected on range of performance indicators. Corre-
lation analysis was used to investigate hypothesized associations
between autonomy and selected outcome variables. Those dis-
cussed here include indicators of service organization (ratio of
actual to planned beds and ratio of contracted to permanent staff),
hospital revenues (average revenue growth, average revenues per
bed, and reliance on budgetary transfers), and performance/quality
indicators (ALOS and number and composition of surgeries). Re-
sults are presented below along with supplemental discussion and
analysis.
Results
Decision space
Table 1 depicts hospitals’ scores across seven decision-space
criteria. Numerical translation of these results was used to
generate an indexed indicator of autonomy (high, moderate, and
low), which is given in Table 2 along with other pertinent data.
As Table 2 shows, ﬁve of six provincial and municipal hospitals
scored high levels of autonomy as did Hai Chau district hospital. In
Hoa Vang and Tam Ky, district hospitals’ proximity to provincial
hospitals appeared to diminish patient ﬂows, as service users
demonstrated a preference for accessing services at the higher-
level provincial hospital. The table also depicts socioeconomic
conditions across localities surveyed (indicated by per capita in-
come), date of decree implementation, and budget transfers as a
share of revenue in 2006.
As Table 2 suggests, hospital type and location appeared to ac-
count for only part of the degree of autonomy. Among provincial
and district hospitals, the timing, governance, and modalities of
autonomization varied, as did the nature of hospital directors’ re-
sponses. The timing of decree implementation, which offered some
indication of authorities’ disposition toward the decrees, appeared
to be shaped by local institutional conditions. A health ofﬁcial in
Hanoi noted, for example, that “therewere no separate instructions
for the implementation in the health sector, but the (municipal)
Department of Finance pressured us to implement it swiftly.” By
contrast Tu Du municipal hospital delayed implementation for
three years, mainly because the hospital’s practices far outstripped
that permitted under Decree 10. In 2005 the hospital remunerated
staff at over ﬁve times state pay norms, while the decree permitted
only a two-fold increase. However, though it implemented later, Tu
Du exhibited a higher level of indexed autonomy than did Hanoi.Quang
Ninh
Cam
Pha
Yen
Hung
Tam Ky Nui
Thanh
Hai
Chau
Hoa
Vang
Cai Lay
2003 2005 2006 2005 2007 2004 2003 2003
Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial
þþ þþ þþ þþ þþ þþ þþ þþ
þþ þ þ/ þ  þþ  þ
þþ þ þ/   þ þ
þþ þ þ/   þþ  þ
þþ þ þ/ þ/ þ/ þþ þ þ
       
þ þ/   þ þþ þ þ/
Table 3
Correlation results: autonomy level and hospital outcomes.
Outcome variable Correlation
Actual/planned beds 2006 0.59*
Average occupancy rate, 2001e2006 0.32
Contract/permanent staff 2006 0.36
Average growth rate of revenues 0.54*
Average revenues per bed 2006 0.79**
Budget transfers as share of total revenue 0.67**
Average growth rate in class I surgeries 0.39
Average growth rate in length of stay 0.38
Average growth rate in consultations 0.31
Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*0.05, **0.01.
Table 2
Hospitals listed by indexed level of autonomy and other criteria.
Hospital Hospital
type
Beds
(planned)a
Avg. income
per capita
of locality
Implementation
of Decree 10
Budget transfers/
hospital revenue
(2006)
Level of autonomy
(indexed)
2 Tu Du Municipal 1000 29.7 2005 9.80 H (15)
1 Hanoi Municipal 250 28.6 2004 15.8 H (14)
9 Da Nang Provincial 830 17.5 2003 22.4 H (14)
12 Tien Giang Provincial 650 7.6 2004 12.4 H (11)
3 Quang Ninh Provincial 490 14 2003 39.5 H (11)
10 Hai Chau District 150 16.5 2004 42.9 H (11)
6 Quang Nam Provincial 500 6 2004 23.2 M (8)
13 Cai Lay District 250 6.6 2003 21.2 M (6)
4 Cam Pha District 190 18 2005 46.7 M (6)
11 Hoa Vang District 140 8 2003 53.2 L (4)
7 Tam Ky District 100 12 2005 28.3 L (3)
8 Nui Thanh District 90 e 42.7 L (3)
5 Yen Hung District 110 7.9 2006 46.6 L (2)
14 Cho Gao District 60 7 e 45.3 e
a 2006 Data, H¼ high autonomy, M¼moderate autonomy, L¼ low autonomy.
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on the need for regulation. In these documents, Provincial People’s
Councils, their executive People’s Committees, and subordinate
DOHs bore formal responsibility for oversight of autonomization.
Yet actual oversight varied. To promote implementation of Decree
43, Hanoi’s DOH organized review meetings every three to six
months, as well as training courses for hospital directors, heads of
planning divisions, and accountants. In other provinces coordina-
tion met minimum requirements. In interviews, ofﬁcials formal-
istically reported great attention to inspections andmonitoring, but
this is impossible to verify and it bears emphasis that health reg-
ulators in Viet Nam are not independent. In Tien Giang province,
the DOH noted that it had established a special evaluation group to
regulate internal spending, but did not mention that the creation of
that group occurred in the aftermath of a spate of well-publicized
scandals at various hospitals in the province (see, for example,
Pháp Luật, 2012). Through their regular assessments of hospital
expenditures for insured patients, provincial and municipal health
insurance agencies have the potential to play a signiﬁcant regula-
tory role. Yet these agencies appeared to be overstretched and
relatively powerless.
Finally, the level of autonomization across hospitals appeared
contingent on the interests and capacities of local authorities and
hospital management. Hospital directors’ orientations inﬂuenced
not only the pace and scope of autonomization but the sense of
‘ownership’ and ‘buy in’ among hospital staff. Data from interviews
revealed that most autonomous hospitals studies shared in com-
mon enterprising leadership who steered autonomization, some-
times involving heads of key departments. For example, in Tu Du
and Hai Chau hospitals (high autonomy), hospital directors
appraised heads of department and the labor union on the hospi-
tal’s ﬁnancial situation quarterly and actively disseminated de-
cisions, regulations, and proposals to staff as notiﬁcation or for
discussion. Whereas in Yen Hung district hospital (low autonomy),
staff appeared to be marginal to the hospital director’s decisions.
Service organization/revenue/performance
Table 3 presents results of autonomy and across various hospital
functions.
Service organization and hospital functions
The most striking trends associated with autonomization were
the rapid expansion of “patient-requested services” and the
installation of technologically-sophisticated diagnostic equipment.These were strongest in the municipal and provincial hospitals and
weakest in district hospitals, with the notable exception Hai Chau.
The dependent variable ratio of actual to planned beds (where the
latter are state-determined and subsidized) captures this dynamic,
as the introduction of ‘patient-requested services’ was the chief
driver of increases in patient beds. Statistical analysis found a
strong (r¼ 0.59, p< 0.05) positive correlation between autonomy
and the actual/planned beds.
In all of the sampled hospitals, occupancy rates of planned beds
exceeded 100 percent, requiring multiple patients sharing single
beds in some wards. However, occupancy rates of actual beds was
below and in some cases well-below 100 percent, owing not only to
unutilized beds in such wards as traditional medicine and reha-
bilitation, but also to the addition of ‘superior’ beds under ‘patient-
requested services’ schemes. There was no signiﬁcant correlation
between autonomy and occupancy rates. Notably, hospitals still
have an incentive to secure additional planned beds, which requires
hospitals to demonstrate overcrowding. As under Decrees 10 and
43, all but fully autonomized hospitals continue to receive signiﬁ-
cant budgetary support.
Autonomization was also associated with increased mobiliza-
tion of capital for new investments in infrastructure, equipment
procurement, staff pay, utilization of human resources, and the role
of the hospital director. Immediately upon the adoption of Decree
43 in 2007, Tu Du hospital mobilized US$1.8 million from diverse
non-budgetary sources for infrastructure investment. Among dis-
trict hospitals sampled Hai Chau was alone it its construction of a
separate patient-requested services building, located around the
block from the main hospital (see Image 2); though virtually all
district hospitals had introduced ‘superior rooms’ and ‘superior
Table 4
Average annual increase rate in total revenue in three years prior to and three years
after autonomy, selected hospitals (unit: %)
No. Hospital Prior to autonomy After autonomy
Obstetrics hospital
1. Hanoi G/O 8.41 25.72
Provincial general hospitals
2. Quang Ninh 14.46 24.79
3. Quang Nam. 18.44 38.45
4. Da Nang 0.7 31.48
5. Tien Giang 10.66 22.43
District hospitals
6. Hoa Vang 21.14 20.75
7. Hai Chau 22.98 26.34
8. Cai Lay 15.82 16.47
J.D. London / Social Science & Medicine 96 (2013) 232e240 237beds.’ Notably, the introduction of “patient-requested” beds did not
substantially reduce overcrowding, as “normal” beds continue to be
shared by two or even three patients. In all hospitals, the scale of
new investment in “regular services” for “normal” patients was
slower.
Clearly, autonomization facilitated the introduction of new med-
ical equipment. In the three years after autonomization, six provincial
and municipal hospitals sampled surveyed doubled or tripled the
number of equipment purchases valued at over VND 10 million. In-
vestments were undertaken through joint ventures and build-
operate-and transfer (BOT) schemes, both of which involved the
placement of advanced equipment such as CT scanners, color ultra-
sound sets, and endoscopes by investment partners. (As one provin-
cial hospital director offered, “No one wants to invest in a boiler,
sterilizer, or compressor.”) Across hospitals sampled, it was common
practice forhospital staff themselves to invest innewequipment. (Not
until 2011did theMinistryofHealth issuea resolution recommending
against such practice.) It bears mention that many aspects of service
organization, though they had important implications for hospital
revenues and expenditures, may not be detected by analysis of hos-
pital budgets, as theprocurementof newcapital equipmentwasoften
ﬁnanced through non-budgetary means.
One of the chief beneﬁts of autonomization envisaged by pro-
ponents was that it would help to “resolve” staff pay issues. In
practice, effects of autonomization on pay were uneven. In the
hospitals surveyed surgeons received performance-based pre-
miums and allowances in addition to a general pay increases, and
staff in clinical departments received more than general staff. Fully-
autonomous hospitals increased pay substantially by introducing
wage coefﬁcients of 2.0 or 2.5, whereas in the remaining provincial
hospitals this ﬁgure ranged from 0.8 to 2.0. With the exception of
the Hai Chau in Da Nang, which had a 0.9 coefﬁcient, pay rises in
district hospitals came either in the form of periodic ﬁxed pay-
ments or otherwise modest lump sums of around $20USD. Some
provincial and district hospital staff lamented the modest pay in-
creases in the light of concomitant increases in hospital capacity
and patient volume.
Autonomization affected the management of human resources
in ﬁve principal ways. First, surveyed hospitals reported little real
discretion over the ﬁring and hiring of full-time staff, even though
Decrees 10 and 43 formally confer these powers. Second, on other
hand, autonomization often appeared to boost staff morale and a
sense of shared enterprise, as could be detected in staff comments
about the importance of “attracting” patients to “their” hospital.
Third, hospitals with higher autonomy invested in or subsidizing
training for staff, as an incipient productivity imperative and an
emphasis on the roll out of new services put a premium on pro-
fessional development, particularly with respect to operating new
diagnostic equipment. (Da Nang’s general hospital even awarded
cash prizes for top results in technical or language training.) Fourth,
hospitals undertook the internal reallocation of staff, including the
introduction of staff rotations between “patient-requested” and
normal services wings and buildings, a practice one municipal
hospital director state was a way of ensuring evenness of quality
and harmonization of interests. While it remains practically
impossible to shed regular staff, many hospitals used the increased
decision space to hire ﬂexible labor.
Autonomization transforms the responsibilities of hospital
managers and the logic of hospital management. Comments by
hospital directors and higher-level staff conveyed a sense of “buy-
in” and emphasized the need to educate themselves about subjects
like management, ﬁnances, and health economics. Directors of
many hospitals actively sought to emulate “successful models,”
such as joint ventures, but often did so without regard to speciﬁc
decree provisions or analysis of its ﬁnancial implications.Several hospital directors proposed the need for an independent
specialized hospital manager; none of the hospital staff inter-
viewed had any training in management or health economics.
Finally, staff in hospitals with higher autonomy indicated a greater
awareness of patients as customers. Several hospitals have intro-
duced customer service improvements such as administrative
streamlining, feedback mechanisms including patient surveys and
complaints hotlines, and courses on customer service.
Financial operations
Prior to autonomization, increases in hospital income owed to
general trends toward the greater utilization of services, increased
private and public expenditure, and the expansion of health in-
surance. Yet statistical analysis suggested a signiﬁcant positive
correlation between autonomy and increased revenues (r¼ 0.54,
p< 0.05) and a strong positive correlation between autonomy and
average revenues per bed in 2006 (r¼ 0.79, p< 0.01). Not surpris-
ingly, higher autonomywas negatively associated with dependence
on budget transfers (r¼0.67, p< 0.05). Isolating the effects of
autonomization on revenues and revenues per bed is made difﬁcult
by the high correlation between autonomy and average per capita
income of hospitals’ respective service areas. (For every 1 million
Dong increase in average household incomes in the service area
there was a 0.452 observed increase in autonomy index, at 0.004
signiﬁcance level in a bivariate regression.) While increases in
revenues can be attributed to causes other than autonomization
(e.g. increased health spending, health insurance, and so on), only
autonomization is associated with the expansion of user fees
generated through patient-requested services and use of equip-
ment procured through non-budgetary means, such as joint ven-
tures, phenomena that were systematically more prevalent among
higher-autonomy hospitals.
Revenues increased most dramatically in provincial and
municipal hospitals, particularly those with high autonomy. As
Table 4 (below) shows, the ﬁve provincial and municipal that
implemented Decree 10 and 43 saw a doubling or trebling in their
rate of revenues growth in the subsequent three years, whereas
there was no discernible effect on revenues in the three district-
level hospitals that had implemented during that same period. At
Tu Du, Hanoi, and Tien Giang hospitals, fees had become the largest
single source of revenues, though revenues from insurance tended
to increase across all hospitals.
At the Hanoi OBGYN hospital, average annual revenue growth in
the three years before and after implementation was nine and 26
percent, respectively. There were also signiﬁcant increases in
average revenue growth per bed; the municipal OBGYN and
province-level hospitals saw signiﬁcant increases between 2001
and 2006, ranging between 23 and 38 percent in the year following
Table 6
Composition of revenue sources in selected district hospitals (2006) (unit: %).
Revenue
source
Cam
Pha
Yen
Hung
Tam
Ky
Nui
Thanh
Hai
Chau
Hoa
Vang
Cai
Lay
Cho
Gao
Government
budget
46.7 40.6 28.3 40.9 42.9 53.2 21.2 45.3
User fees 17.0 13.6 9.9 10.3 10.7 13.6 50.8 39.0
HI 32.2 45.8 56.2 44.6 41.8 32.8 21.2 13.8
J.D. London / Social Science & Medicine 96 (2013) 232e240238implementation, and amounting to a two-fold increase over the
entire interval (Table 5).
Autonomization together with health insurance has contributed
to changes in the composition of revenues, as after autonomization
revenues growth from user fees accelerated at the provincial and
municipal hospitals. The largest revenue shares in provincial hos-
pitals came from patient-requested services, as well as surgical and
obstetrics departments; the lowest came from departments of
neurology, pediatrics, and rehabilitation. Although prices for stan-
dard services remained stable, revenues from user fees as a pro-
portion of total revenues increased from approximately 50 percent
in 2001 to above 70 percent in 2006 for both obstetrics hospitals,
while Tien Giang provincial hospital’s 2006 ﬁgure was above 85
percent.
Changes in hospital ﬁnance were less striking in district hospi-
tals, where budgetary transfers typically accounted from 40 to over
50 percent of total revenue. At Cho Gao district hospital, located in a
poor district of Tien Giang, 70 percent of expenditure on equipment
procurement was ﬁnanced through the state budget. However, at
the district level, the signiﬁcance of health insurance is seen. Across
all sampled hospitals, payments from health insurance accounted
for 30e55 percent of total revenues, but in district hospitals were
relatively more signiﬁcant than user fees (Table 6). While increased
revenue from health insurance is not attributable to autonomiza-
tion, increased decision space can facilitate growth in insurance
payments as hospitals can make insurance pay for services that
would otherwise not be afforded or prescribed. Interviews with
health insurance departments across province evidenced concern
that, without more effective monitoring, increased autonomization
could have adverse ﬁnancial implications for the insurance fund.
Nor should the effects of insurance be exaggerated. In some
hospitals, the general slowness of reimbursement process meant
that insured patients were not always welcome.
Changes in patterns of expenditure exhibited variation within
and across different hospital levels. All hospital managers surveyed
reportedmovement toward greater cost-control across all levels, as
indicated by increased internal monitoring of income and expen-
diture through greater centralization of management and accoun-
tancy functions, and greater attention to the management
responsibilities of staff. In some hospitals, cumbersome procedures
were reduced by electronic record-keeping. In provincial and
municipal hospitals spending on medicines and materials propor-
tionate to other items declined, in some cases signiﬁcantly. At theTable 5
Average revenues per patient bed in study hospitals, 2001e2006.
2001 2002 2003
Municipal obstetrics hospitals
Tu Du 77,936 83,977 115,
Hanoi GO 89,818 77,899 90,
Provincial hospitals
Quang Ninh 44,113 37,733 42,
Quang Nam 32,738 35,849 38,
Da Nang 59,016 56,288 71,
Tien Giang 54,464 61,680 51,
District hospitals
Cam Pha 33,635 41,131 40,
Yen Hung 47,435 49,773 48,
Tam Ky 156,988 191,695 166,
Nui Thanh 45,710 48,551 56,
Hai Chau 37,545 41,067 52,
Hoa Vang 29,887 36,206 41,
Cai Lay 58,178 67,383 73,
Cho Gao 31,317 30,706 30,
Note: shaded boxes indicate the years when these hospitals initiated implementation ofdistrict level, modest decreases were achieved in administrative
and overhead expenses, partly due to campaigns to reduce water
and electricity consumption and district hospitals rated savings as a
signiﬁcant source of increased expenditure. District hospitals spent
proportionately more on medicine and consumables, and less on
operational and administrative costs. Some hospitals introduced a
form of secondary capitation scheme, which increased awareness
of management across functional departments; now “each chief
nurse is also an accountant,” one hospital director quipped. Still,
changes in patterns of revenue and expenditure in the years
immediately subsequent to decree implementation do not capture
what are arguably the most important effects of autonomization on
hospitals’ operations: the development of a commercial ethos
within nominally public hospitals and the creation of new oppor-
tunities for licit and illicit earnings which ﬂow variously to indi-
vidual and hospital coffers. Whether and to what extent income
generated through patient-requested services and the use of new
equipment will occasion signiﬁcant cross-subsidization of “normal”
services in the future remains to be seen.
Performance/quality
Interviews with hospital staff suggested that autonomy
contributed to both technical competency and possibly to user
satisfaction, though the data did not always support such claims.
The association between autonomization and quality/performance
as indicated by ALOS and trends in surgeries is ambiguous. Addi-
tional discussion centers on the increasing use of diagnostics
equipment and the implications of autonomy for costs.
ALOS is sometimes used as a proxy for quality of care, in which
lower ALOS is indicative of higher quality. In three of four provinces,
hospitals with higher autonomy had higher ALOS while, post-
implementation, all provincial hospitals surveyed showed signiﬁ-
cant increases in average ALOS. Declines observed in the average
ALOS in the obstetrics hospitals possibly owed to a general trend for2004 2005 2006
885 146,823 177,832 202,029
066 110,363 116,092 154,300
252 49,959 66,890 90,333
971 49,432 81,323 69,193
701 62,365 94,725 88,778
306 59,323 66,419 81,697
649 49,236 58,938 71,312
669 44,656 40,659 48,431
194 76,968 59,596 90,439
598 47,610 81,557 69,383
878 73,422 85,253 105,766
328 48,387 58,038 64,676
100 86,172 99,083 85,417
760 32,865 42,363 36,068
Decree No. 10.
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district-level hospitals there were marked increases in ALOS, in
some cases exceeding rates for provincial hospitals, even as the
latter tend to treat more severe cases. Discerning the relationship
between increased ALOS, autonomization, and insurance would be
an important aim for future research, as would associations be-
tween autonomization, insurance, and surgical procedures. In the
study, Class I surgeries, the most complex procedures, declined in
three of four hospitals, perhaps owing to improved diagnostic ca-
pabilities or other considerations. In provincial hospitals therewere
modest increases in referral rates, which cast doubt on staffs’ claims
that autonomy had contributed to general improvements in capa-
bilities beyond diagnostics. Interestingly, relatively more autono-
mous hospitals tended to use fewer medicines, perhaps because no
markup is permitted on standard medicines. The average number
of drugs used in caesarean and gastro-duodenitis cases declined in
municipal and provincial hospitals, but increased at the district
level, raising questions about ALOS incentives, capabilities, and
moral hazard.
The increased use of diagnostic equipment speaks further to the
ambiguous impacts of autonomization on quality. Autonomization
was followed by steady increases in indications of imaging in
municipal, provincial, and some district hospitals. Whether these
increased indications are a response to needs, the availability of the
equipment, or ﬁnancial incentives, there are mounting concerns
about abuse. As one insurance ofﬁcial in Hanoi put it, “if before
(placement of the diagnostics equipment) there were 30 tests
ordered. after there were 200.” The two municipal obstetrics
hospitals sampled evidenced no sharp increases in caesarean-
sections, though one hospital had considerable increase in
average diagnostic indications, from 8.5 to 11, between 2004 and
2007. This rate is above double the average for the ﬁve other pro-
vincial and municipal hospitals surveyed. Expert review concluded
that CT scans were indicated with “clear and reasonable judgment”
in three of ten cesarean cases at this same hospital.
A ﬁnal implication of autonomy with respect to quality/perfor-
mance concerns the cost and accessibility. Overall, there have been
signiﬁcant increases in the price of services, particularly in more
autonomous hospitals, despite only minor adjustments in the 1995
price schedule. Most prices increases are accounted for by the
introduction of “patient-requested,” which is available across the
full range of medical procedures. The daily charge for a bed in such
a wing or ward ranged from VNÐ300,000 to 500,000 in HCMC and
from VNÐ30,000 to 80,000 in provinces and districts. Prices for
cesarean deliveries rosemost sharply in HCMC’s obstetrics hospital.
Across province-level hospitals, average payments for gastro-
duodenitis treatment showed great variability, whereas among
district-level hospitals there was a six-fold difference between the
least and most expensive treatment price. In the pricing of its own
patient-requested services, Da Nang hospital simply added a 25
percent markup on all itemized services.
Pricing trends reﬂected an increasingly stratiﬁed system of
service provision, though this study made no attempt to assess
whether the same quality standards are maintained across these
emerging strata. In interviews, administrators and doctors typically
downplayed any differences, though it is notable that in some
larger hospitals doctors’ time was divided between patient-
requested and “normal” services, while in other hospitals some
medical equipment is physically located in patient-requested
wings.
It is difﬁcult to assess the impacts of autonomization on acces-
sibility. Poorer people are more likely to use services at district-
level hospitals as they have less ﬁnancial ability to jump the
referral chain. Even if more autonomous hospitals are generally
located in wealthier locations, these communities contain poorpopulations. It was found here that in such provinces, poorer in-
dividuals were likelier to forego treatments than those in poorer
districts with less autonomous hospitals. Both qualitative and
quantitative ﬁndings suggest that the poor and ‘near poor’ who are
not formally-recognized as such may be most adversely impacted
by autonomization, given their inability to afford insurance.
Conclusion
Hospital autonomization in Viet Nam is generating complex and
varied effects. In municipal and provincial hospitals, autonomiza-
tion has created opportunities to reorganize services, increase in-
vestments and revenues, and improve staff pay. The effects of
autonomy on service quality are unclear. District hospitals’ more
limited opportunities to take advantage of autonomymay easewith
continued economic growth. Autonomization has for now not
eased pressure on overburdened hospitals and has contributed to
the promotion of more costly and socially stratiﬁed services. Absent
signiﬁcant regulation, the ﬁnancial incentives autonomization
brings have prompted the rapid expansion of commercial activities
within the shell of nominally public hospitals, where there is an
obvious distinction between “patient-requested services” and
“normal” services. In a sense, “co-location” of public and private
services has already occurred.
Small sample size and non-random sampling limit this study’s
generalizability, while data constraints limited analysis to correla-
tion. Although the study initially aimed to compare hospitals that
autonomized with those which had not, the introduction of Decree
2006 meant that all hospitals were autonomized. Without having a
group of control hospitals, it was formidably difﬁcult to assess the
impacts of autonomization independent of other factors, and
increased payments from insurance and rising incomes in partic-
ular. Finally, data was collected at a relatively early stage of
autonomization while effects of autonomization may be expected
to intensify over time. These limitations notwithstanding, it is
hoped this analysis has contributed new insights into the early
stages of hospital autonomization in Viet Nam, adding to existing
empirical literature on decentralization and healthcare in transition
countries and Viet Nam in particular.
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